This article extends the analysis of Atkinson, Foley, and Ganz in"Beyond the Spoiler Effect: Can Ranked-Choice Voting Solve the Problem of Political Polarization?". Their work uses a one-dimensional spatial model based on survey data from the Cooperative Election Survey (CES) to examine how instant-runoff voting (IRV) and Condorcet methods promote candidate moderation. Their model assumes an idealized electoral environment in which all voters possess complete information regarding candidates'ideological positions, all voters provide complete preference rankings, etc. Under these assumptions, their results indicate that Condorcet methods tend to yield winners who are substantially more moderate than those produced by IRV. We construct new models based on CES data which take into account more realistic voter behavior, such as the presence of partial ballots. Our general finding is that under more realistic models the differences between Condorcet methods and IRV largely disappear, implying that in real-world settings the moderating effect of Condorcet methods may not be nearly as strong as what is suggested by more theoretical models.

We introduce BallotRank, a ranked preference aggregation method derived from a modified PageRank algorithm. It is a Condorcet-consistent method without damping, and empirical examination of nearly 2,000 ranked choice elections and over 20,000 internet polls confirms that BallotRank always identifies the Condorcet winner at conventional values of the damping parameter. We also prove that the method satisfies many of the same social choice criteria as other well-known Condorcet completion methods, but it has the advantage of being a natural social welfare function that provides a full ranking of the candidates.

We initiate the study of simple games from the point of view of combinatorial topology. The starting premise is that the losing coalitions of a simple game can be identified with a simplicial complex. Various topological constructions and results from the theory of simplicial complexes then carry over to the setting of simple games. Examples are cone, join, and the Alexander dual, each of which have interpretations as familiar game-theoretic objects. We also provide some new topological results about simple games, most notably in applications of homology of simplicial complexes to weighted simple games. The exposition is introductory and largely self-contained, intended to inspire further work and point to what appears to be a wealth of potentially fruitful directions of investigation bridging game theory and topology.

Building on previous work, this paper extends the modeling of political structures from simplicial complexes to hypergraphs. This allows the analysis of more complex political dynamics where agents who are willing to form coalitions contain subsets that would not necessarily form coalitions themselves. We extend topological constructions such as wedge, cone, and collapse from simplicial complexes to hypergraphs and use them to study mergers, mediators, and power delegation in political structures. Concepts such as agent viability and system stability are generalized to the hypergraph context, alongside the introduction of the notion of local viability. Additionally, we use embedded homology of hypergraphs to analyze power concentration within political systems. Along the way, we introduce some new notions within the hypergraph framework that are of independent interest.

We use simplicial complexes to model simple games as well as weighted voting games where certain coalitions are considered impossible. Topological characterizations of various ideas from simple games are provided, as are the expressions for Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for weighted games. We calculate the indices in several examples of weighted voting games with unfeasible coalitions, including the U.S. Electoral College and the Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We use simplicial complexes to model simple games as well as weighted voting games where certain coalitions are considered impossible. Topological characterizations of various ideas from simple games are provided, as are the expressions for Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for weighted games. We calculate the indices in several examples of weighted voting games with unfeasible coalitions, including the U.S. Electoral College and the Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina.